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Detail of the Argument in Reply
REPLY ARGUMENT I.
Adverse Counsel Asserts Heresy (or Maybe I Mean "Hearsay")
Over and over and over again, like a whipporill's call, the Real Party
in Interest iterates the same refrain: To wit, some unidentified clerk of
the Tooele Justice Court erroneously stated that the requisite filing fee was
only $70 for appeal of a small claims action to district court for trial de
novo. To quote verbatim:

"SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS

Defendant Jennifer Castle timely

paid the filing fee represented to her by the clerk of the Tooele Court....
Clerks are assigned the responsibilities to collect fees and do in fact
represent the amounts of fees to the public. Ms. Castle relied on this
amount...." (Opposing brief of Defendant/Real Party in Interest at
p. 10.)
"ARGUMENT I.

Ms. Castle Timely Paid a Portion of the Filing

Fee in this Matter in Reliance on Statements of Court Personnel....
Plaintiffs primary argument in his motion to dismiss the underlying
appeal from the small claims court and this writ is that Defendant failed
to properly pay the filing fees in this matter and this case should be
dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. The undisputed facts indicate that
this mistake was caused by a combination of clerical error and inadvertence." Id. at p. 12.
Plaintiff's argument ignores the realities of what occurred in this
case and often occurs, namely clerks give this information out [pertaining
1
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to filing fees] all the time and it is universally relied upon....This Court
noted in Dipoma that a party should be able to rely on the statement of
Court clerks." Id. at p. 17.
"As is customary [Customary? So why wasn't a discrepancy in the
amount due noticed on this occasion?], the undersigned's office called
the justice court and stated that an appeal was going to be filed and
requested the amount of the fee. The response was given that the
amount due was $70.00....[A]nd therefore the error was apparently
missed by the Justice Court clerks. This error seems to be a combination
of the mistake by the undersigned's office in failing to send the $10.00,
and the clerk's office not requesting the payment of the $10.00...." Id. at
p. 13.
"9. [Statement of Facts]

Defendant, relying on the aforementioned

facts, failed to pay this additional $10.00 filing fee to the Justice Court
until February 26, 2003." Id. at p. 8.
"Defendant's counsel simply failed to pay the full filing fee with the
notice of appeal due to and [sic] reliance upon the conversation between
the secretary and the clerk of the court....In the present matter, Defendant
would lose her opportunity to defend herself and be heard for a mistake
in failing to pay an additional $10.00 fee, which was an error made by
both counsel and the clerks of the court." Id. at p. 18.
"The incorrect amount was paid due the above-referenced error....
Counsel's secretary called the clerk to verify the amount due and
reasonably relied and in fact acted on that statement." Id. at p. 15.
"As recited above, Defendant timely filed her notice and paid the fee
requested by the court clerk." Id. at p. 19. "Accordingly, Plaintiff [sic]
2
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reasonable [sic] relied on the statements of the court clerks...." Id. at
p. 20.
"[B]oth this Court and the Court of Appeals have held...that a party
must be allowed to reasonably rely on the representation of court clerks.
The facts...stand for the proposition that the court (in that case, the
Court of Appeals) has the ability to retain jurisdiction over the matter if
the error of timely filing was due to a clerical error." Id. at p. 20.
"[T]he error was due to reliance on statements from the clerks of the
court and the trial court properly allowed the appeal." Id. at p. 25.
"Her [Real Party in Interest's] only redress on appeal would have
been her reliance on the court clerks..." Id. at p. 24.
On the above, excepttorrattlesand ease name, Italics ami anderllnlng were
addedJ
The Pressing Question Before the Court Is: Shall Hearsay Decide This Case?
Now Utah Rule of Evidence 801 (a) denotes such a claimed oral
assertion by the purported anonymous clerk as a "statement".

And the

alleged clerk himself is defined in subpart (b) to be a "declarant".
Thereafter the Rule goes on to gloss "hearsay" as: "'Hearsay' is a

statement, other than one made by the declarant while testifying at the trial
or hearing, offered in euidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted."
(See Addendum, Exhibit "C", for copy of Rule.)

In other words, what

evidence is adduced to prove that any clerk ever made such a statement
to the secretary of the counsel to the Real Party in Interest? Is an
3
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affidavit of the purported clerk himself (or herself) ever presented? No,
the evidence of the truthfulness of the asserted matter rests solely upon
the ipse dixit (that's Latin for "she herself says so") of the secretary on her
own behalf.

(Refer to her affidavit at pp. 79, 80, 322 & 323 of record; see

Addendum, Exhibit "D")
The Hell of It All Re Hearsay and the Utah Rules of Small Claims Procedure
O.k., so let's posit that what we have here is hearsay of a most crimson
hue. Was an objection to that effect ever lodged with the trial court?
No, uh-uh.
Why not? Well, to understand that, you have to appreciate (or at
least take account of) the Utah Rules of Small Claims Procedure. Rule

7(d) provides, "The judge may allow hearsay that is probative, trustworthy and
credible."
O.k., so that just moves everything one step down the line, and now
the question becomes, "Was Janet Layosa's affidavit, albeit hearsay, ever
objected to as not being probative, trustworthy, or credible?" No, uh-uh.
Why not? Well, back to the Utah Rules of Small Claims Procedure
again—7(d) further stipulates, "The rules of evidence shall not be applied
Strictly." Now get the fine distinction there: The Rule doesn't say "need
not". The Rule says "shall not". (Jesus, Joseph and Mary, my most
fervent desideration would be to stride into a convening of whatever

4

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

advisory committee formulated those idiotic rules with a freshly honed
pitchfork, having first padlocked all the exits. Those people are an
affront to sound intelligence.)
If the rules of evidence are strictly applied, you can stack
up case law higher than the throne of God to demonstrate conclusively
that, even as hearsay, Janet Layosa's affidavit should be disallowed on
the ground that it is not probative, trustworthy, or credible. Witness:
There is a two-pronged test for determining the admissibility of
hearsay: first, there must be a showing of unavailability and,
second, the testimony must bear sufficient indicia of reliability.
State v. Menzies. 889 P.2d 393 (Utah 1994).
Hearsay is generally not admissible on the ground that it lacks
trustworthiness for two basic reasons: (1) the person who purports
to know the facts is not stating them under oath; (2) that person
is not present for cross-examination.
State v. Sibert, 310 P.2d 388 (Utah 1957).
But Christ in a whorehouse, if you promulgate a rule of procedure
which says, "The rules of evidence shall not be applied strictly. The judge
may allow hearsay that is probative, trustworthy and credible.", you've just given
the judge a license to print money so far as whatever he chooses to deem
"probative, trustworthy, and credible." With respect to the meaning of
those terms, if you can't argue with full and complete reliance upon the
Utah Rules of Evidence and the case law attendant to them, then it's

5
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anybody's guess and the judge can admit anything he wants, and
it's impossible to construct a pleading to confute him on the point.

The Hell of It All Re Discovery and the Utah Rules of Small Claims Procedure
O.k., let's review: We've got a case before the Utah Supreme Court
which apparently is going to be decided based upon the unsupported
(apart from her own self-assertion) seeming hearsay of a lawyer's
secretary who says she correctly rang a certain telephone no. (purportedly that of the Tooele County Justice Court and not the Psychic Hotline),
that someone answered claiming to be a clerk (she can't specifically say
who), and we have her word for it that they distinctly told her the filing
fee was $70, and she didn't misunderstand them in any way.

Oh yeah,

and the someone who allegedly told her that is unavailable for crossexamination because she doesn't know their name. And the judge's
admission of that dubious profession cannot be effectively challenged
because the pertinent procedural directive is that "The rules of evidence
shall not be applied strictly."

Jesus wept!

But maybe things aren't quite so dismal as they seem. I mean, so
what if we don't know precisely which clerk to call and cross-examine?
After all, how many can there be? Three or four at the most? Why not
simply subpoena and depose them all?
Well, those advisory committee dolts who formulated the Utah Rules
of Small Claims Procedure happened to thwart even that.

6
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Rule 6(a)

enjoins, "No formal discovery may be conducted...". The question of deposing
all the justice court clerks was discussed with Judge Skanchy in open
court and he indicated he was not inclined to allow it.
The Hell of It All Re Motions and the Utah Rules of Small Claims Procedure
It is impossible to properly assess the meaning of any answer to a
question apart from distinctly knowing what was posed. For example,
the response "I hate blacks" would denote something entirely different
coming after the query "Is there any misconception about yourself which
people have?" than it otherwise might.
Anyway, THE CRUX of the Real Party in Interest's case is that her lawyer's secretary WAS MISINFORMED about the proper filing fee due. To
cite the secretary's affidavit: "I specifically asked the Justice Court Clerk
what the appropriate filing fee was for an appeal from a Justice Court small
Claims decision...I was informed that the filing fee would be $70.00...I was
not told by the Justice Court Clerk of any additional fees to this $70.00."
However, even when deprived of the ability to challenge this affidavit
via strict application of the Rules of Evidence (as complained about
above), I think it could still be held that the secretary's testimony wasn't
probative ABSENT A YET MORE DEFINITE RECOUNTING OF THE ALLEGED
ACTUAL QUESTION POSED AND THE EXACT RESPONSE PURPORTEDLY
PROVIDED BY THE CLERK. Otherwise it might still be that the ostensible
answer of $70.00 is entirely correct without any misstatement on the part
7
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of the clerk.
Very well, so was this objection ever raised and the issue laid at the
feet of the trial court?

No, uh-uh.

Why not? Well, back to the f****** Utah Rules of Small Claims
Procedure again. Rule 6(b) provides, "Written motions and responses may be
filed prior to trial. Motions may be made orally or in writing at the beginning of the
trial. No motions will be heard prior to trial."
NOW HOW IN THE HOLY NAME OF F*** could a judge rule
on a written motion made at the beginning of trial that he hadn't
had a chance to read, nor the adverse party an opportunity to
respond to?

God bugger me.

Anyway, procedurally here's what happened: I filed a Motion to
Dismiss Appeal [for court's lack of jurisdiction] on February 24&, 2003
(found at pp. 48-63 of record).

Thereafter, on February 28^, 2003, a

Memorandum in Opposition to Plaintiff's Motion to Dismiss Appeal (found
at pp. 77-88 of record) was filed by the adverse party . IT WAS IN
CONNECTION WITH THIS FILING that counsel for the adverse party first
raised the insistence that the counsel's secretary was misinformed as to
the filing fee, and I intended to challenge this contention.

ON THIS

SAME DATE a notice (found in record at pp. 75-76; see Addendum, Exhibit

8
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"F") was sent informing the parties that the judge proposed, contrary to
the procedural rules, to decide this motion at a pretrial conference on
March 17& . On March 11&, realizing that I couldn't adequately be
prepared by the date of the pretrial conference to reply to the adverse
party's Memorandum in Opposition, I moved the court for a continuance,
which was denied. So on Saturday, March 15&, I sent a fax to the judge
(filed March 17&; found at pp. 117-123 and 124-130 of record; see
Addendum, Exhibit "G") saying (in essence), "All right, ya bastard, I
would be prepared to stipulate to this motion being dealt with at a
pretrial hearing, because after all, when else are you logically going to
address a motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction? At trial like the
insane court rules require?

But if you're going play hardball with me,

it's quid pro quo, and I'm putting you on notice that I've never agreed to
waive any of the relevant rules, and you're out of order to proceed as you
are." Thus I preserved the issue.
I assert the foregoing with much emphasis, because counsel for the
Real Party in Interest has charged at p. 15 of his opposing brief:

"Counsel's secretary called the clerk to verify the amount due and
reasonably relied and in fact acted on that statement. Plaintiff challenges this fact, however, he has not properly disputed it here or in the
court below....First, no counter affidavit was filed in the trial court."
And at p. 16 thereof, "In the trial court he only asserted that the
9
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undersigned's secretary is a liar."
But the countervailing facts are these:
1.) I could not challenge Janet Layosa's affidavit on the ground
that it is hearsay, because hearsay is admissible in a small claims
action.
2.) Apart from a strict application of the Utah Rules of Evidence,
something not allowed under the procedural rules, it was virtually
impossible to attack it as hearsay which is not "probative, trustworthy,
or credible".
3.) And although I might have been able to defeat it by showing at
the time of trial that it wasn't "probative"— because neither Janet
Layosa's alleged query to the clerk nor the clerk's purported answer
were ever adequately delineated in the affidavit— I wasn't able to do
even that because the procedural rules weren't followed regarding
the disposition of motions in a small claims action. A further motion
for reconsideration was presented at trial, but under the strictures
consequent to such a pleading, only the issues of the original motion
as heard and denied by the court could be revisited.

IT IS NOTEWORTHY that both Petitioner and Real Party in Interest
reach concordance on this: If not that I preserved the issue, then at least
that this "responsive letter" (as her counsel terms it) was in lieu of any
other counter contention. As the brief of the Real Party in Interest
concurs at p. 9 under "Statement of Facts":

10
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"11.

Plaintiff did not file a reply memorandum, butfileda

responsive letter [March 15 fax to judge] with various attachments. See
Record 96-130 [bolder typeface added]
"12.

Plaintiff filed no counter affidavits alleging that the clerks

made no such statements to defense counsel's secretary."
Now there's an old Chinese proverb (really): The antidote for poison
is yet more poison (sort of their way of saying "fight fire with fire"). And
what adverse counsel suggests is that I should have matched a Roland for
an Oliver and refuted Janet Layosa's hearsay affidavit with a hearsay
affidavit of my own, asserting that the justice court clerks had related to
me the very opposite of what she was claiming.

REPLY ARGUMENT II.
Innocence Is No Excuse (or Is That "Ignorance" Rather?)
What constitutes (in the sense of a proscription against giving it)
"legal advice"?

Well, there seems to be a paucity of Utah jurispru-

dence defining it, but there's no lack of federal case law.

Well, to start

with, ANY statement intended to apprise or admonish another in respect
of the law

such as "That's illegal; report it to the police" or "You ought

to sue the bums"

qualifies as legal advice. But some legal advice

rises to the level of "the unauthorized practice of law", and some does
not. Disciplinary Counsel v. Palmer, 761 N.E.2d 716 (Ohio 2001).
HEREAFTER only illustrations embracing "legal advice" which can

11
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subject someone to that liability will be cited.
DEFINITIONALLY HOWEVER, all authorities agree that for a jural
propoundment to be deemed "legal advice" it must possess TWO
QUALITIES. NO. 1, it has to be directed toward expounding rights and
obligations. FOR EXAMPLE, let's suppose I bump into Justice Durrant
one day and I pose to him, "What's the difference between murder and
manslaughter? I've never understood that distinction." For the next six
hours he can laboriously explicate the contrast in minute detail, and such
a discourse couldn't get him in any hot water. HOWEVER, If I were to
ask, "Could I be prosecuted if I did this?", that's completely dissimilar,
because in that instance he'd be delineating rights and responsibilities to
me. (And please take heed that the question of any filing fee that it is
incumbent upon a person to pay certainly denotes a "legal responsibility".)
NO. 2, in order to be considered "legal advice" a jural propoundment
has to be interpretive of the law.

FOR EXAMPLE, if Justice Durrant were

to say to me, "Whenever you operate a motor vehicle, the law says you
must do so safely", that is NOT a statement that could be deemed "legal
advice" even though it clearly states a legal obligation on my part. NOR
would "If someone libels you, you can sue them" qualify, even though a
legal right is thereby presented. HOW COME?

Because neither of these

statements is genuinely interpretive of the law.

However, if Justice

Durrant were to say, "When you pull across the centerline to pass

12
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someone, you may exceed the posted speed limit in order to do so as
quickly as possible", that involves both statement of a right and an
interpretation of law, and therefore fits the definition of "legal advice".
And when a clerk declares to someone, "The requisite filing fee is $70",
that too is an interpretation of the law.
BEAR IN MIND that it is not the complexity or simplicity of an
utterance which determines whether or not it is interpretive of the law

rather it is the nature of the statement.

For example, in the case of In re

Herren, 138 B.R. 989 at 995 (Bkrtcy.D.Wyo. 1992) (see Addendum, Exhibit
"H") , it was actually maintained, "Further, the court finds and
concludes that the [alleged unauthorized practitioner's] exhortation to
'please don't delay...your debt problem will not go away..unless you act
NOW, is itself giving legal advice." (Mother of God! You gotta be
kiddin' me!)
ANOTHER CONSIDERATION serving to determine if giving "legal
advice" subjects someone to liability for "the unauthorized practice of
law" is whether it is directed to a specific individual or not. FOR
EXAMPLE, let's suppose Associate Chief Justice Durrant is featured as a
speaker at a convention of the American Bar Association. And there he
addresses the throng and says, "I'm convinced that military conscription
is an abrogation of the constitutional guarantee against involuntary
servitude, and that no citizen is obliged to comply with a draft notice." If

13
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I ran down to the Judicial Conduct Commission with a copy of his
remarks and protested, "Look at this; old man Durrant is going so far as to
dispense legal advice to every man jack in America", they'd laugh me to
scorn and respond, "Well, if it ever gets to the point where he's directing
himself to some distinct person, let us know. But until then...."
HOWEVER, if I were to call him up on the telephone and say, "Guess
what, Matt, I've been ordered to report for induction", and he replied,
"You [and I emphasize YOU meaning Clif Panos] are not bound to do so if
I know anything about the law", he could sure get sanctioned for that as
a sitting jurist.

Because then he'd be furnishing instruction to an

,

identifiable individual as to their legal rights and responsibilities.
LIKEWISE, if a court or judicial authority disseminates legal information TO THE COMMUNITY AT LARGE, that's o.k.. For example, if you go
to the Utah State Courts' web site (www.utcourts.gov), they've got tons
and tons of this "be your own lawyer" crap on there, like:
Pro Se Guide to Appeals Procedures
(http://www.utcourts.aov/courts/appen/prose.htm).
Pro Se Guide to Filing Petition for Writ of Certiorari
(http://www.utcourts.gov/resources/forms/certi/prose.htm), and
Glossary of Legal Terms
(http://www.utcourts.gov/resources/glossary.htm).
In fact, to relate the purpose of all this in their own words, "In an effort to

educate and inform court users, Utah's State Courts have created a web
based resource to address frequently asked questions as well as provide
<

step-by-step

instructions

on how to complete common court
14
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procedures."

(Italics and underlining added).

Now for the sake of further elucidation, let's consider the last of those
self-help resources listed above, the Glossary of Legal Terms. Sweet
jumpin' Jesus, DO YOU REALIZE that in the case of In re Kaitangian, 218
B.R. 102 at 111 (Bkrtcy.S.D.Cal. 1998) (see Addendum, Exhibit "I"), the
federal courts have held, "In connection with preparing legal
documents,...providing clients with explanations or definitions of such
legal terms of art as 'reaffirmation' is, by itself, the giving of 'legal
advice [which may subject non-attorney to liability for the
'unauthorized practice of law']." And there Kaitangian gave as
precedent In re Herren (previously cited above), in which it was held at
994-995, "In connection with preparing legal documents, such as the
[bankruptcy] schedules, providing clients with definitions of such legal
terms of art as 'creditors holding secured claims,' 'real property,'
'executory contracts,' and the like is, by itself, giving legal advice." And
at 995, "[D]efining terms in the schedules...require[s] exercise of legal
judgment beyond the capacity and knowledge of lay persons."
AND IF YOU THINK THAT'S NITPICKING, GET A LOAD
OF THIS: In the case of In re Landry, 268 B.R. 301 at 304
(Bkrtcy.M.D.Fla. 2001) (see Addendum, Exhibit "J"), it was actually
maintained, "The very act of directing [someone] to review a particular
section of a legal book, in and of itself, constitutes 'legal advice,' [which
15
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non-attorney is prohibited from purveying]/'

HOWEVER, that must be

qualified by pointing out that it was noted in Kaitangian at 109, "In
deciding whether an eviction service was engaged in the unauthorized
practice of law, the appellate court in People v. Landlords Professional
Services, 215 Cal. App. 3d 1599,1608,264 Cal. Rptr. 548 (4th Dist. 1989)
found:...'merely giving a client a manual, even a detailed one containing
specific advice, for the preparation of an unlawful detainer action and the
legal incidence of an eviction would not be the practice of law if the service
did not personally advise the client with regard to a specific case."' (italics
and underlining added). And this aspect of Landlords' Professional
Services, regarding which Kaitangian remarked at 113 that the "[CJourt
found personal contact was a key factor in finding defendant was engaged in
the unauthorized practice of law" (underlining added), was commented
upon again in n. 13 thereto: "The court in Landlords' Professional Services
reviewed similar cases in other jurisdictions. For example, in Oregon State
Bar v. Gilchrist, 272 Ore. 552, 538 P. 2d 913 (1975) the court concluded that
it was not an unauthorized practice of law to advertise and sell divorce kits so
long as the service had no personal contact with a client. In New York
Lawyers' Assn. v. Dacey, 21 N.Y.2d 694, 234 N.E.2d 459, 287 N.Y.S.2d 422
(1967), the court found sale of Norman F. Dacey's book 'How to Avoid
Probate' was not an unauthorized practice of law since there was no personal
16
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contact or relationship with any particular individual...." (underlining
added). AND HENCE I emphasize that the alleged questioning of some
court clerk on the telephone by the adverse counsel's secretary, as
opposed to pro se legal guides being furnished impersonally on the Utah
State Courts' web site, weighs heavily in the assertion that the clerk
improperly gave legal advice to the secretary.
BY ALL THAT MEN CALL HOLY, DO YOU MEAN TO TELL
ME that if I were to ring up Pat Bartholomew or Matty Branch and
inquire, "So what does the term 'collateral estoppel' denote?", they
couldn't (under U.S. law at least) give me their version of whatever they
think it means, BECAUSE that would be rendering "LEGAL ADVICE"? Or,
if I were to call and ask, "Where the hell does it say I have to file 10
copies of my brief?", for the same reason Pat couldn't just fax me a copy
of Utah Appellate Procedure Rule 26 with subpart (b) circled? TECHNICALLY, NO!
How then can that precise information be disseminated on the Utah
State Courts' web site? Or how can they propagate on there a Glossary
of Legal Terms? BECAUSE IN THAT INSTANCE THE JUDICATURE IS
DIRECTING INFORMATION TO THE PUBLIC AS A WHOLE, AND NOT
RESPONDING TO A SPECIFIC LITIGANT'S INQUIRY. This rationale
upholding the Utah State Courts' web site is predicated upon "New York
County Lawyers' Association v. Dacey [see Addendum, Exhibit " M " ) , 28
17
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A.D.2d 161,283 N.Y.S.2d 984, reversed and dissenting opinion adopted 21
N.Y.2d 694, 287 N.Y.S.2d 422, 234 N.E.2d 459 (N.Y. 1967), which held that
the publication of forms and instructions on their use does not constitute the
unauthorized practice of law if these instructions are addressed to the public
in general rather than to a specific individual legal problem....Other states
have adopted the principle of law set forth in Dacey, holding that the sale of
legal forms with instructions for their use does not constitute unauthorized
practice of law. See State Bar ofMichigan v. Cramer; 399 Mich. 116,249
N.W.2d 1 (1976); Oregon State Bar v. Gilchrist, 272 Or. 552, 538 P.2d 913

,

(1975). However, these courts have prohibited all personal contact between
the service providing such forms and the customer...." Citing (underlining
i

added) Florida Bar v. Brumbaugh, 355 So.2d. 1186 at 1191 (Fla. 1978) (see
Addendum, Exhibit "K"). Nevertheless contrarily, "The Supreme Court of
Florida has taken a different view and has held that the giving of specialized
advice to a general audience rather than to a particular individual constitutes
the practice of law. See The Florida Bar v. American Legal & Business

<

Forms, Inc., 274 So.2d 225 (Fla. 1973) and The Florida Bar v. Stupica, 300
So.2d 683 (Fla.1974)." Citing (underlining added) Gilchrist (see Addendum,
Exhibit "L") at 918.
Does that mean, as the attempted reductio ad absurdum on p. 16 of
i

adverse counsel's brief suggests, that if I sashay up to the front counter
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and try to file a nonconforming brief, Pat Bartholomew can't say,
"PURSUANT TO R.App.P. 27(e), your brief is rejected for filing", because
such a statutory reference constitutes a provision of "legal advice"? NO,
that's o.k., because in that instance Pat Bartholomew would not be
advising me as to a right, duty, responsibility, or obligation which J have,
but a right, duty, responsibility, or obligation which SHE has. Also, she
would be making a public pronouncement on behalf of the Court. Even
if we were the only two people in the office at the time, it doesn't matter.
It would still be a public pronouncement made on behalf of the Court.
However, if she were later to mail me a copy of Rule 27(e) with a note on
it saying, "You need to read this", that would be an improper private
communication between her and me AND a prohibited affordment of
legal advice.
LIKEWISE, if the lawyers' secretary Janet Layosa rings up a clerk of
the Tooele Justice Court and inquires, with respect to the amount of the
filing fee she must submit, what her legal responsibility is. ONLY
LICENSED ATTORNEYS ARE ALLOWED TO AUTHORITATIVELY ADVISE
INDIVIDUALS WHAT THEIR RIGHTS AND RESPONSIBILITIES ARE. The
clerk may accede to voice his opinion on the point, but in doing so he
enters into private communication with a litigant and is not speaking
publicly on behalf of the Court. Ignorance is no excuse, and the Court
does not provide legal apprisement, and if Janet Layosa turns to a clerk
for guidance because she doesn't know the statutory provisions, fine.

19
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But she cannot raise an objection of ineffective assistance of counsel if
the non-attorney advice she gets from the clerk turns out to be wrong.

REPLY ARGUMENT III.
Exhibits "H" and "I" of Opposing Brief Attempt to Dupe Court
The Real Party in Interest clamors for the Court to take note of the
putatively misleading and incomplete information on relevant filing fees
provided on the Utah State Courts' web site. At pp. 9-10 of opposing
counsel's brief, under the heading "Statement of Facts", these points are
alleged:

"17. Court personnel list the filing fees on the State Court Web Site
as well as provide the public, including attorneys, a schedule of filing
fees. The fees listed on the website prior to the May 2003 changes stated:
'Trial de novo $70.00' with no distinction between small claims
departments of district courts and small claims decisions of the justice
courts. See Fee Schedule from State Court's Website, attached to
Addendum of Defendant and marked as Exhibit ' H \
"18. The current fee schedule form produced by the State Court
System and given to the public, including the undersigned's office states:
'Trial De Novo (Justice or Small Claims Court) $75.00' See Fee
Schedule produced by State Courts, attached to Addendum to Defendant
and marked as Exhibit 'I'."
(italics and double underlining added in both instances above)
GEE, SOUNDS SERIOUS, MAYBE WE BETTER TAKE A LOOK, starting
with Exhibit "I".

There, up at the top of the page, the fee schedule is
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clearly captioned "DISTRICT COURT

Effective May 5, 2003". Wow, I

wonder if maybe when the fee schedule says, "Trial De Novo (Justice or
Small Claims Court) $75.00", it means the fee in district court is $75.0°-.
regardless of whether the appeal is from the district court's small claims
department or from a justice court? GOSH, MAYBE Exhibit " H " CAN GIVE
US A HINT.
The heading of this fee schedule clearly says. "Utah Code Annotated
§78-7-35; Filing Fees". And if you reference this schedule on the actual
website (at http://www.utcourts.gov/resources/Fees.htm), you'll notice
there's a link there to the actual statute.

Click on that, and here's what

you'll read:

78-7-35. Civil fees Of the COUrtS of record- Courts complex design.
(1) (a) The fee for filing any civil complaint or petition invoking the
jurisdiction of a court of record not governed by another subsection
is $155.
(b) The fee forfilinga complaint or petition is:
(i) $50 if the claim for damages or amount in interpleader exclusive
of court costs, interest, and attorney fees is $2,000 or less;
[statute truncated here; italics, underlining, and use of bolder type added]
O.k., so what's going on here at the Utah State Courts' Web site?
What it boils down to is there's this whole long laundry list of proceedings
21

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

and functions pertaining to district court. And you've got fees listed for
various writs and expungements and abstracts and probate stuff and
divorce and child custody matters and tort suits and whatnot, and just
basically all this sh** that a justice court (which is not a court of record)
isn't involved with. SO CONSEQUENTLY THE STATUTE DEALING WITH
DISTRICT COURT FILINGS FEES IS LONG AND CONVOLUTED AND GOES
ON FOR PAGE AFTER PAGE IN THE UTAH CODE ANNOTATED.

So what

the Utah State Courts' web site has graciously and conveniently done IS
TAKE THIS STATUTE AND RENDER IT IN GRAPHIC FORM, i.e., MAKE A
PICTURE OUT OF IT for those pro se litigants who are reading impaired.
ALL RIGHT, SO WHY DIDN'T THEY DO THE SAME DAMNED THING with
U.C.A. §78-6-14, the statute dealing with justice court filing fees?
BECAUSE §78-6-14 is so f****** simple that anybody can understand it,
even in just words alone, maybe even a lawyer.

It doesn't need to be

portrayed in graphic or pictorial form. All it says is:

"78-6-14. Civil filing fees.
(1) Except as provided in this section, the fees for a small
claims action in justice court shall be the same as provided in
Section 78-7-35...
(4) The fee in the justice court for filing a notice of appeal for
trial de novo in a court of record is $10...." [italics added]
IN OTHER WORDS, when the Utah State Courts put those charts on
22
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their web site, they weren't trying to represent to the public, "Look, these
are all the statutes that have anything to do with filing fees." All they
were attempting was to take some of the HARD TO FOLLOW ones and
make them more comprehensible to all the trailer-park white trash out
there wanting to get restraining orders against their deadbeat boyfriends
and so on.

REPLY ARGUMENT IV.
Proper Fathoming of Pari Materia Refutes Adverse Party's Case Law
At various places in his opposing brief, adverse counsel refers to
the "incorporation" of one statute or rule into another. To wit:

At p. 10, "Rule 12 of the Utah Rules of Small Claims Procedure did not
incorporate Rule 4-803 of the Utah Rules of Judicial Administration."
At p. 11, "For these same reasons, the District Court did not disregard
Rule 4-803 of the Utah Rules of Judicial Administration. This Rule is
not incorporated into Rule 12 of the rules of Small Claims Procedure."
At p. 14, "The Court noted [in Dipoma v. McPhie] that these sections
[such as was previously stated, "Utah Code Ann. §21-1-5 (now
renumbered as 78-7-35)"] were not incorporated into the Rule 3
governing the filing of complaints and that no payment was required
to invoke jurisdiction."
At p. 15, "Rule 4-803(2)(D) of the Rules of Judicial Administration
requires fees to be paid to invoke jurisdiction. However, as in
Dipoma, this Rule is not incorporated into Rule 12 of the Rules of
Small Claims Procedure."
23
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And finally at p. 20, "Defendant [Castle] would first submit that the
District Court did not ignore the requirements of Rule 4-803. As
argued above, Rule 4-803 does require the filing of the fee. For the
reasons set forth in Part I, Rule 12 does not incorporate Rule 4-803.
Accordingly, the filing fee was not jurisdictional and the district court
properly conducted the de novo trial."
(except for the case name, italics and underlining were added in all
instances above)
Since the conclusion propounded by this last statement reveals that
opposing counsel presents an argument to this Court predicated in large
measure upon the thesis that Small Claims Rule 12 does not incorporate
C.J.A. Rule 4-803. there are two questions to be taken up in rebuttal:
1.) Does the doctrine of pari materia not dictate that Small Claims
Rule 12 must be construed in conjunction with C.J.A. Rule 4-803?
2.) If such is the case, then why did the Court in Dipoma hold that
R.Civ.P. 3(a) was not likewise so affected by statutes similarly connected
with it?
THE ANSWERS TO BOTH OF THESE QUESTIONS LIE IN A CLEAR
UNDERSTANDING OF PARI MATERIA. In addressing this doctrine, the
prominent authority of Sutherland Statutory Construction has been
heavily relied upon. Hereafter excerpts quoted from it are cited by page
no. with reference to the sixth edition by Norman J . Singer, 2000 revision,
and photocopies of such are in the Addendum. All are extracted from

volume 2B, §51.01 "Interpretive relevance of related statutes", §51.02
24
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"Statutes on the same subject construed together", and §51.03 "Statutes
deemed to be in pari materia". To wit:
"Statutes are considered to be in pari materia [the 4th ed. 1984
additionally has at this point "and thus must be construed together"]
when they relate to the same person or thing, to the same class of
persons or things, or have the same purpose or object."
(pp. 201 -202; see Addendum, Exhibit "N")
The Utah Supreme Court, quoting the above excerpt from the 4th ed.
1984 at p. 467 in Utah County v. Orem City, 699 P.2d 707 (Utah 1985),
continued on,

"If it is natural or reasonable to think that the understanding of the
legislature or of persons affected by the statute would be influenced by
another statute, then those statutes should be construed to be in pari
materia, construed with reference to one another and harmonized if
possible/" (underlining and italics added; footnotes omitted).
In Cazares v. Cosby, 2003 UT 3, 65 P.3d 1184, the Utah Supreme Court
referred to a citation from the 4th ed. 1973 "...for the proposition that legislatures know of statutes of related subject matter and have them in mind when
enacting new statutes.../' (underlining added).
These same canons of interpretation were voiced again in
T.R.F. v. Felan, 760 P.2d 906, 909 (Ut. App. 1988):

"It is presumed the Legislature intends to achieve a consistent body of
law. 1A C. Sands, Sutherland Statutory Construction § 23.09, at 332 (4th
ed. 1985). Thus, statutes relating to the same subject matter 'should be
25
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construed with reference to each other and harmonized, if possible/ so
that effect is given to every provision of the statutory scheme/''
(citation omitted and underlining and italics added).
"[E]ach section of a law which deals with the same subject matter
must be read in pari materia with other sections on the same
subject." (p. 202; see Addendum, Exhibit "N")
K

[C]ourts have held that application of the rule must be applied

before any other rules of statutory construction."
(p. 235; underlining added; see Addendum, Exhibit "O")
"The rule that legislative provisions which are pari materia
should be construed together applies also to rules of court."
(p. 185; underlining and italics added; see Addendum, Exhibit "P")
This is determinative to the illation that Small Claims Rule 12
must be read in pari materia with U.C.A. §78-6-14(4) and C.J.A.
Rule 4-803(2)(D).
"For example, it has been held that Rules of Civil Procedure
promulgated by a Supreme Court have the same force and efiTect as
statutes passed by the legislature.30
30

Pennsylvania. The statutory provision and the Rules of Civil Procedure
relate to the same subject matter, partition of property, and therefore should be
read in pari materia. Lohmiller v. Weidenbaugh, 503 Pa. 329,469 A.2d 578 (1983)."

(p. 233; underlining and italics added; see Addendum, Exhibit "Q")
"To be in pari materia, statutes need not...refer to one another."
(p. 235; see Addendum, Exhibit "O")
So it'd certainly prove decisive if Small Claims Rule 12 were to say,
26
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"The appropriate fee, as provided in U.C.A. 5578-6-14(4)
and 78-7-35, must accompany the Notice of Appeal", or,
"Pursuant to C.J.A. Rule 4-803(2)(D), the appropriate fee
must accompany the Notice of Appeal".

However, it may not be inferred from a lack of such direct reference
that the conjoint statute and rules are not to be construed together.
An example of this rule made operative is to be found in Utah
County v. Orem City further on at pp. 709 and 710:
''The—statutes mentioned—have as a common purpose the identification of those who may use county jails and who must bear the costs of that
use. Thus, these statutes should be construed with reference to one
another and harmonized if possible....[S]ection 17-22-9 (federal prisoners)
and section 10-13-23 (town prisoners), neither of which is mentioned in
section 17-22-8. require that the county be compensated for the expense of
boarding those prisoners. Therefore, it is only reasonable that the cities
also could be required to compensate the county for incarceration of city
prisoners even though such a requirement is not specifically mentioned in
section 17-22-8." (underlining and italics added).
O.K., SO HOW COME, AS ADVERSE COUNSEL CORRECTLY POINTS
OUT, THE COURT IN DIPOMA HELD THAT R.Civ.P. 3(a), RELATING TO
FILING A COMPLAINT. DOES NOT INCORPORATE U.C.A. §21-1-5 (now
renumbered as 78-7-35), RELATING TO THE FILING FEE THEREFOR?
Well, to realize why, you have to understand two further wrinkles in
the doctrine of pah materia. To wit:
"When the language of a state act [or rule] is adopted from
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(

federal legislation [or procedural provisions], courts will ordinarily
construe the state statute [or rule] in accordance with the construction given the federal statute [or rule]."
(p. 188; see Addendum, Exhibit "R")
And of utmost importance to comprehend the honorable Court's
holding in Dipoma:
"But if words [or provisions] used in a prior statute... are omitted, it will be presumed that a change of meaning was intended."
(p. 199; see Addendum, Exhibit "S")
"... 'where a statute [or rule], with reference to one subject
contains a given provision, the omission of such provision from a
similar statute [or rule] concerning a related subject is significant
to show that a different intention existed.>w
(pp. 199-201; underlining added in both instances)
Two cases are footnoted at p. 188 of Sutherland to illustrate this point:
" 14 United States. ...The deliberate selection of language so differing from
that used in earlier Acts indicates that a change of law was intended. Gutierres de
Martinez v. Lamagno, 515 U.S. 417,115 S. Ct. 2227,132 L. Ed. 2d 375 (1995).
...Idaho. The amendment recognizes that the main purpose of punitive
damages (deterrence) is destroyed when the wrongdoer dies. The fact that a similar amendment was not made to the later statute is evidence that the legislature
did not intend to allow living wrongdoers to escape the imposition of punitive
damages. Gavica v. Hanson, 101 Idaho 58,608 P.2d 861 (1980) (overruled on other
grounds by, Sterling v. Bloom, 111 Idaho 211, 723 P.2d 755 (1986))."

WITH THE ABOVE FIRMLY IN MIND, ALL THAT REMAINS TO ATTAIN A
CORRECT GRASP OF THE HONORABLE COURT'S HOLDING IN DIPOMA v.
McPHIE IS TO CITE THEREFROM. To wit:
" 1 1 1 This court has not addressed the issue [as presented in
28
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Dipoma] of whether the payment of filing fees is a jurisdictional
requirement for commencing an action at the trial level. However, this
court has addressed whether filing fees are jurisdictional on appeal. In
doing so, this court hasrconsistently looked to the plain language of the
applicable rule when construing it, thereby declining to read additional
language into the rule. For example, in Prowswood, Inc. v. Mountain Fuel
Supply Co., 676 P.2d 952 (Utah 1984), this court addressed the question of
whether payment of docketing fees is a jurisdictional requirement under
rule 73 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, which governed the filing of
appeals prior to 1985. [And quoting the honorable Court's holding in
State v. Johnson, 700 P.2d 1125 at 1128 (Utah 1985), "We more recently
reviewed this issue in Prowswood...and concluded that failure to pay
the filing fee within the requisite period is a defect of jurisdictional
magnitude."] Rule 73 stated in pertinent part: 'A party may appeal
from a judgment by filing with the district court a notice of appeal, together
with sufficient copies thereof..., and depositing therewith the fee required for
docketing the appeal in the Supreme Court/ Id. at 954-55 (quoting Utah R.
Civ. P. 73(a)). In determining whether rule 73's docketing fee requirement
was jurisdictional, the Prowswood court distinguished rule 73 from rule 3
of the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure, which set forth only the
requirement that an appellant must file a notice of appeal, and then stated:
'Failure of an appellant to take any step other than the timely filing of a
notice of appeal does not affect the validity of the appeal, but is ground only
for such action as the court of appeals deems appropriate, which may
include dismissal of the appeal/ Id. at 958 (emphasis added) (quoting
Fed.R.App. P. 3(a)). The Prowswood court concluded that the plain
language of rule 73, unlike rule 3 of the Federal Rules of Appellate
Procedure, expressly made both the notice of appeal and the docketing fee
requirement jurisdictional. See id. at 959.
"% 12 However, on January 1,1985, rule 73 was superseded by rule 3
29
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of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, Rule 3, like rule 3 of the Federal
Rules of Appellate Procedure, contained no express reference to payment
of the docketing fee at the time of filing as a jurisdictional requirement.
Accordingly because the language making payment of filing fees a jurisdictional requirement had been removed / this court, in State v. Johnson,
held that '[u]nder Rule 3, the timely payment of fees on an appeal from the
district court to this Court is no longer jurisdictional/

700 P.2d 1125,1129 n.

1 (Utah 1985) (emphasis added).
"113 ... See Hausknect v. Indus. Comm'n, 882 P.2d 683,684-85 (Utah
Ct.App.1994) (holding payment of required fees jurisdictional under Utah
Rule Appellate Procedure 14, where rule stated that '[a]t time of filing any
petition for review, the party obtaining the review shall pay to the clerk of
the appellate court such filing fees as are established by law, and also the fee
for docketing the appeal' (emphasis added) (quoting Utah R.App. P.
14(b)))." (The language of this rule hasn't changed and it still obtains.)
(internal quotations omitted; underlining added in all instances above)
(quoting Dipoma v. McPhie, 2001 UT 61, 29 P.3d 1225 at 1228,1229)
And the Court of Appeals gave this restatement of the foregoing in
Raiser v. Buirley, a case adduced in the adverse party's brief to evince a
pivotal point thereof:

"1 5 Following adoption of the current rule 3(a) of the Utah Rules of
Appellate Procedure, the Utah Supreme Court ruled that timely payment
of the filing fee for appeal is not jurisdictional. See State v. Johnson, 700
P.2d 1125,1129 n. 1 (Utah 1985) (holding plain language of rule 3(a) establishes that 'the timely payment of fees on an appeal from the district court
to this court is no longer jurisdictional')." (underlining and bolder type30
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face added; quoting Raiser v. Buirley, 2002 UT App 277, 54 P.3d 650).
Although a very careful reading of the above is necessary to observe
the contrast, in Dipoma v. McPhie the Court was addressing the issue of
whether the filing fee was a jurisdictional requisite under Civil Procedure
Rule 3(a), and in State v. Johnson it undertook whether the fee was jurisdictional per Appellate Procedure Rule 3(a). Insomuch as neither of
these rules contained a plain language mandate of fees, the Court held in
both cases that the only jurisdictional requirement was either the filing
of a complaint in the first instance or a notice of appeal in the latter.

However, in Gorostieta v. Parkinson, 2000 UT 99,17 P.3d 1110, the
question at bar was which section of Appellate Procedure Rule 3 should
govern? As the Court phrased the matter at U 17 of its holding,
"Parkinson relies on rule 3(f) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure for her
position. The Gorostietas counter that rule 3(a) is dispositive.../' (contrasting
bolder typeface added)
Thereafter, at If 19 of Gorostieta, the Court offers an analysis as to
which section controls, but it significantly concludes by harking back to
the Court's determination of this rule in State v. Johnson — namely that,
in the permutation of the former R.C/V.P. 73 into the present R.App.P. 3,
the omission of prior express language which made the filing fee
jurisdictional must be taken as intending a change of meaning in the rule
in that regard. And this is in keeping with the precepts of the doctrine of
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i

pari materia.
But observe this variance very carefully:

Whereas

distinct omission off a prior provision from a succeeding
embodiment of a statute/rule, or even from a similar,
related statute/rule, must be taken to indicate a
contrasting intended meaning of the legislature in such
cases, this DOES NOT MEAN that if a provision appears in
one related statute/rule, but is absent from another,
then the statutes/rules cannot be read in pari materia to
give effffect to all provisions off each.

Perhaps juxtaposing two

differing principles relied upon by the Utah Court of Appeals in the 1995
case of State in Interest of R.NJ., 908 P.2d 345 at pp. 348 and 349, will
serve to enunciate this contrast:
"[OJur conclusion is consistent with the general principle 'that when
two statutory provisions conflict, the more specific provision will prevail
over the more general provision/ Williams v. Public Ser'v. Comm'n,, 754
P.2d 41, 48 (Utah 1988)/'
"Our conclusion is also supported by the principle that 'the later
expression of the legislature' controls when statutes conflict or overlap in
their treatment of the same subject matter....(quoting 2A C. Sands,
Sutherland Statutory Construction, § 51.02 at 290 (4th ed. 1973))." (internal
quotations and citation omitted)
The preceding two prescripts are not specifying the same thing, and
the former of them, which crucially bears upon the assertion that Small
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Claims Rule 12 must be read in pari materia with U.C.A. §78-6-14(4) and
C.J.A. Rule 4-803(2)(D). was given prior expression by the Utah Supreme
Court in State ex rel. Public Service Commission v. Southern Pac. Co., 95
Utah 84, 79 P.2d 25 (1938):

"The rule, however, is that, where there is a general provision and a
specific one, the specific must be given full effect. 11 Amjur. 663. This
rule of statutory construction was upheld in Salt Lake City v. Salt Lake
County, 60 Utah 423,209 P. 207, wherein it was said (page 208): "Further, it
is an elementary doctrine that, where two statutes treat of the same
subject-matter, the one general and the other special in its provisions, the
special provisions control the general. State ex rel. Morck v. White, 41
Utah 480,126 P. 330; Nelden v. Clark, 20 Utah 382, 59 P. 524, 77 Am.St.Rep.
917; University of Utah v. Richards, 20 Utah 457, 59 P. 96,77 Am.St.Rep.
928; Crane v. Reeder, 22 Mich. 322."
Desitively, a succinct summation of the foregoing argument can
perhaps be found in this citation from Murray City v. Hall, 663 P.2d 1314,
1318 (Utah 1983):

"In construing these two statutes, we rely on another well-established
rule of statutory construction, which provides:
'[l]t is assumed that whenever the legislature enacts a
provision it has in mind previous statutes relating to the same
subject matter, wherefore it is held that in the absence of any
express repeal or amendment therein, the new provision was
enacted in accord with the legislative policy embodied in these
prior statutes, and they should all be construed together.[...]
Trior statutes relating to the same subject matter are to be
compared with the new provision; and if possible by reasonable
33
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construction, both are to be so construed that effect is given to
every provision in all of them.'
2A C. Sands, Sutherland Statutory Construction § 51.02, at 290 (4th ed. 1973).
Sections [being reviewed by the court] are in pari materia....Thus. these
statutes should be construed with reference to each other."
(internal quotation truncated; underlining added in all instances
throughout)

SO IN CONCLUSION, as was previously expounded concerning
this decretum of statutory construction, "To be in pari materia, statutes
need not...refer to one another."

Even at H 10 of its holding in Dipoma,

the Court was careful to observe this qualification: "Dipoma argues, in
response, that rule 3 contains no language requiring filing fees, nor expressly
incorporates sections 21-1-1, 21-1-5, or 21-7-2 of the Utah Code.../' (bolder
typeface added). AND IT IS POSITED IN THE PRESENT MATTER THAT
PARI MATERIA ALSO REQUIRES that Utah Small Claims Procedure Rule
12 MUST BE construed with U.C.A. §78-6-14(4) and C.J.A. Rule 4-803(2)(D)
AND CANNOT be taken alone.

REPLY ARGUMENT V.
Ignoring All Other Considerations, Appeal Filed Coram Non Judice
In the foregoing section of argument, much effort was expended to
show that the case law as cited by adverse counsel, viz., Dipoma v.
McPhie and Gorostieta v. Parkinson, would not support the assertions of
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his opposing brief at pp. 12 and 13-14 respectively that:

"[T]he Utah Appellate Courts have recognized that failure to pay the
proper amount of the filing fee does not divest a court of jurisdiction,
but requires that the filing fee be paid correctly within a reasonable
period of time."
Or, "The Utah Appellate Courts have held that timely filing of a
notice of appeal or complaint in the trial court is jurisdictional, however
the proper payment of the filing fee is not required if the payment of the
fee is paid within a reasonable time."
For it has been countered inter alia, that the essential factor in conflict
with these declarations of adverse counsel was pointed out and made
clear by his own remark on Dipoma at p. 14 of his opposing brief, "In
sum, the Court noted that in the absence of language mandating that a fee
be paid prior to creating jurisdiction, the filing should be permitted."
(underscoring added to highlight a critical aspect).

HOWEVER, in citing the case of Raiser v. Buirley, adverse counsel
raises a different contention. To wit: LET US SUPPOSE THAT PAYMENT
OF THE FILING FEE WITHIN THE REQUISITE PERIOD WAS INDEED
INDISPENSABLE FOR JURISDICTION.

NEVERTHELESS, IF A TENDERED

AMOUNT, ALBEIT DEFICIENT, WAS SO PAID TO THE COURT CLERK, DID
THE CLERK NOT HAVE AN AFFIRMATIVE DUTY TO PROMPTLY CALL THIS
TO THE PROFFEROR'S ATTENTION. IN ORDER THAT THE MISTAKE MIGHT
HAVE BEEN SUFFICIENTLY REMEDIED?
35
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I

Well, this reflection might prove very compelling apart from one most
salient fact

the Real Party in Interest filed her appeal coram non

,

judice , which is to say, IN THE WRONG COURT.
Absolutely every statute or rule imposing the filing of a notice of
appeal for trial de novo of a small claims action concomitantly specifies
where it should be filed: "...must file a Notice of Appeal (Form K) in the
court issuing the judgment..." (Small Claims Procedure Rule 12(b)); "...by
filing a notice of appeal in the original trial court..." (U.C.A. §78-6-10(1));
"...by filing a notice of appeal in the court issuing the judgment..." (C.J.A.
Rule 4-803(2)(A)). (underlining and italics added)
And if that happens to be a justice court rather than the small claims
department of a district court (the only two possibilities), the following
directs what is to happen next:
"C.J.A. Rule 4-803(2)(F) Procedures - Record of justice court.
Within ten days of the filing of the notice of appeal in a justice court, the
court shall transmit to the district court the notice of appeal, the district
courtfees. a certified copy of the docket or register of actions, and the
original of all pleadings, notices, motions, orders, judgment, and other
papers filed in the case/' (Italics and underlining added)
O.k., what it boils down to is this: If it's a justice court that first heard
the case, you send them a notice of appeal and $80. The justice court
then skims $10 off the top (its cut), and sends the notice of appeal, the
36
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record (such as it is for a court of no record), and $70 up to the district
court. The district court then dockets the case for trial de novo.
Now as to what took place (the res gestae) in the present matter, you
fortuitously don't have to take my word for it; the account of the adverse
counsel in his opposing brief, and the record, can be referred to. His
rendition is perhaps self-contradictory, but here's what he says:
(quoting opposing brief of adverse counsel at p. 6)

"...paid the

$70.00 filing fee...after a telephone call requesting confirmation of the
amount due with the Third District Court Clerk." (italics added)
Contrasting at p. 7 with: «... spo ke with a clerk at the Justice Court
requesting the amount of the filing fee in the appeal of this matter."
(italics added)
But hell, these two statements ain't irreconcilable. Quite
obviously—in a pig's behind rather!—clerks of both courts must have
been contacted about the fee amount.

And here, inconsistent with one of the preceding statements (and two
more that follow), we have Janet Layosa's affidavit:

"7. ...I requested a check in the amount of $70.00 which was
attached to the letter from Richard Barnes in his letter transmitting the
Notice of Appeal to the Justice Court, (italics added)
Which conflicts with adverse counsel's brief at p. 6 under Statement of
Facts:

"3.

Counsel's office was informed that the $70.00 filing fee should
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be sent to the District Court. See id. [i.e., see affidavit of Janet Layosa]"
(italics added)

"4.

The $70.00 filing fee (required by Section 78-7-35) was

sent to the District Court. See letter dated February 12, 2003 from
Richard N. Barnes to the Clerk of the Court, at Record 41-42." (italics
added)
I believe that the above citation to the record is incorrect; the Notice
of Appeal and Richard N. Barnes' cover letter attendant to it, both dated
February 12&, 2003, are at pp. 39-40 thereof.
INDEED TAKE A LOOK AT THEM.

But by all means, DO

I've even put copies of both in the

Addendum (see Exhibits " A " and "B") to aid you in such an examination.

NOW HERE'S THE REAL STORY OF WHAT ACTUALLY HAPPENED
(which, apart from adverse counsel's own above admissions. I also know
from talking to the clerks of both the justice and district courts): The
Notice of Appeal and $70 and the docket of the justice court proceedings
(and any filings therein) should have come to the district court from the
justice court. BUT CONTRARY TO THREE SEPARATE PROVISIONS—of a
statute, a procedural rule, and a rule of court—adverse counsel mailed
$70 and his notice of appeal directly to the district court. Now it was an
obvious tip-off from the case no. cited in the notice of appeal that this was
a justice court case. S O the district court clerk rang down to the justice
court and said, "We've got everything we need here, except the docket
of the proceedings from your tribunal and any pleadings filed therein.
38
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Send those up to us." THEN the district court clerk merely docketed the
case for trial de novo.
Only the district court clerk never inquired of the justice court as to
whether a $10 check had been mailed to them separately or not. And
the TRUE QUESTION AT ISSUE HERE is: Did the district court clerk have
an affirmative duty to make such an inquiry? Well, if she did, it
represents a far, far different matter than anything the appellate courts
have addressed per the case law cited by adverse counsel.
**********************************************************

JUST TWO MORE POINTS, and then I close:
1.) "Familiarity breeds contempt", or so the old maxim goes. Kevin
Tanner, who wrote the opposing brief on behalf of adverse counsel, has
no delusions about how sharp-eyed or nimble-witted appellate court law
clerks are. He once did a stint himself with the Court of Appeals. So
nobody knows better than he how easily they can be thrown off the scent
by a little sly misdirection. And here's the proof of it:
The present case now proceeds at bar only because a petition for
rehearing was granted. And in its aforetime order dismissing this action,
the honorable Court voiced the following:
"The petition for extraordinary relief is denied. Petitioner has not
demonstrated the notice of appeal of small claims judgment was filed
in the wrong court, regardless of any technical errors in the caption
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of the notice, and has not demonstrated the payment of filing fees
was jurisdictional." (bolder typeface and underlining added)
Those discrepant statements made by adverse counsel in his brief
should prevent this hereafter, but how did he previously get the
honorable Court to buy the idea that the Notice of Appeal was merely
miscaptioned rather than filed in the wrong court? Well, if you'll hark
back to my initial brief at p. 16, adverse counsel was able to capitalize
upon and get mileage from Tooele Justice Court and Third District Court,
Tooele Dept., both sharing the same address

47 S. Main Street, Tooele.

And while you're back there, note the point I made about adverse
counsel's cagey use of ambiguity in always referring indistinctly to the
"Tooele Court", as at p. 10 of his opposing brief. But it seems he can
make it work though. And as one devious son of a bitch forced to
concede the slick dexterity of another, I have to grudgingly admire his
deft ability to hocus-pocus the honorable Court.

2.) Well, say anything often enough and it will come to be believed, I
guess. At p. 10 of adverse counsel's brief, he recites with grieved
plaintiveness: "It was not until after the expiration of the ten day appeal
period that Petitioner brought the error to the attention of the parties
through his Motion to Dismiss."
shame?

Mother of God!

Has the man no

Please attentively regard the refutation of this found at p. 11 of

my initial brief, and the gainsaying document at p. 48 of the record.
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Conclusion and Precise Relief Sought
From the foregoing facts and argument, presented to refute the
contentions of adverse counsel's brief in opposition, it is evident and
clear that (a.) it is highly suspect and totally unproven that any justice
court clerk ever misguided or misinformed adverse counsel or his staff as
to the amount of the filing fee due on appeal de novo of the small claims
action, and only hearsay has been adduced to maintain this, (b.) even
assuming arguendo that such misdirection was ever provided by a clerk,
it was improperly sought and relied upon by adverse counsel or his staff,
because a clerk cannot render legal advice, and it has been
demonstrated that such it would be, (c.) the fee schedule charts provided
on the Utah State Courts' website pertain only to sums due in district
courts and not justice courts, and hence adverse counsel wrongly
maintains that he was misled by them, and (d.) the case law, displayed
by adverse counsel to assert that, in similar circumstances, the appellate
courts have held that parties are not to be prejudiced by the missteps of
court clerks, does not apply. Because the Real Party in Interest confused
the situation by filing her Notice of Appeal in the wrong tribunal.
Therefore the Court is prayed to hold for the Petitioner in this matter, and
issue its writ of prohibition to the district court, directing that it cannot
assume jurisdiction, and further directing it to enter an order of dismissal
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of the cause of the Defendant/Real Party in Interest on appeal.
Respectfully submitted,

DATED this 12

th

day of January, 2004.

Clifton W. Panos pro se
Petitioner/Plaintiff

Certificate of Service
Service is constated upon the respective parties' counsels—to each
of them two (2) true and correct replications of the foregoing document
entitled REPLY BRIEF OF PETITIONER ON REHEARING—along with
two (2) copies each of the separately bound Addendum thereto—via
posting by the U.S. Mail, with first-class postage and all other fees
prepaid, to their respective addresses as shown on the official U.S.
Postal Service Certificates of Mailing, exhibited either at Appendix "T"
of the Addendum or immediately hereafter, per the dates postmarked
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PAUL H. MATTHEWS & ASSOCIATES, P.C.
10 West Broadway, Suite 700
Salt Lake City, UT 84101 -2060
Telephone: (801) 355-7007
Facsimile: (801) 355-6006

February 12,2003

Third District Court
Tooele County,
Small Claims Department
47 South Main #141
Tooele, Utah 84074
RE:

Panos v. Castle
Civil No. 02-31
OurFileNo.Allied-413

Dear Clerk of the Court:
Pleasefilethe enclosed original:
1.

NOTICE OF APPEAL.

0*

o^>
xfi
*3

Please alsofindenclosed our check in the amount of $70.00 for the appeal. Please return
your receipt in the enclosed self-addressed stamped envelope.
Very truly yours,
PAUL H. MATTHEWS & ASSOCIATES, P.C.

Richard N.Barnes
RNB:jbl
Enclosures
Letter to Court 01/wpd
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